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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
THE REASONABLENESS AND WARRANT CLAUSES
LUIS G. STELZNER*

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
In these words the First Congress framed the fourth amendment
to the Constitution. The amendment is oddly constructed for one of
the central provisions of the Bill of Rights, containing two principal
clauses whose meaning, relationship and relative importance have
consistently created controversy.
A cursory reading exposes the apparent ambiguity created by the
draftsmen of the fourth amendment. The first clause memorializes a
"right ... to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." It is followed by a second clause listing specific requisites for
the issuance of a valid warrant. What is the relationship of one clause
to the other? Is a search reasonable only if it complies with the
specific instructions of the warrant clause? Does the reasonableness
clause provide a broad search authority permitting some searches
without warrants?
Two principal theories, the "general reasonableness" and "warrant" theories, have evolved as interpretations of these two conjunctive clauses. The classic expression of these conflicting theories is
found in the majority opinion of Justice Minton and in Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz.3
Justice Minton observed that "[i] t is unreasonable searches that
are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment [citation omitted]. It was
recognized by the framers of the Constitution that there were reasonable searches for which no warrant was required." 4 Reasonableness
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (Minton, J.,majority opinion;
Frankfurter, J., dissenting opinion), overruled in Chime] v.California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 5-6 (1978); 3 A.
4Amsterdam, Trial Manual 3 for the Defense of Criminal Cases 229 (1975).
3. 339 U.S. at 56-66, 68-86.
4. Id. at 60.
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"is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution
does not define what are 'unreasonable' searches .... [T] he reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case." ' Advocates of Minton's view contend that the
reasonableness clause is preeminent in the amendment and independent of the warrant clause, which is simply a detailed prescription
for the constitutionality of searches made with prior judicial authorization. They argue that warrantless searches and seizures are tested
on the facts and circumstances of each case by a generalized, subjective reasonableness standard. 6
Justice Frankfurter eloquently disagreed with Justice Minton. He
urged that the fourth amendment be read in light of "the history
that gave rise to the words." '7 The framers, declared Justice Frankfurter, said, "that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity." 8 In
other words, reasonableness must be read in terms of the amendment's second clause. The fourth amendment thus proscribes
searches without warrant where it is practicable to obtain one, with a
few historically defined exceptions.9
Fourth amendment jurisprudence has developed substantially
since Rabinowitz. Minton's majority opinion has been overruled.' 0
While it is clear that "reasonableness" is a concept broader than the
precise rules of the warrant clause and applies to police activities that
are not subject to the warrant requirement,' ' it is established that
the state must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of at least full-scale searches.' 2
Nevertheless, the controversy so effectively highlighted by Justices
Minton and Frankfurter continues, though in somewhat modified
form. Today the issue arises most frequently with respect to lesser
intrusions such as frisks or temporary detentions for questioning.' '
The modem version of the controversy is best phrased by two questions. First, to what extent is reasonableness under the fourth
amendment defined by the specific requirements of the warrant
5. Id. at 63.
6. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. at 1884; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63-66.
7. 339 U.S. at 69.
8. Id. at 70.
9. J. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 229.
10. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11. W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 439.
12. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). But see 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure:
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 5 (1978).
13. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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clause and the abuses it proscribes? Secondly, under what circum-

stances will the Court, under the general test of reasonableness, allow
relaxation of the warrant clause requirements?
This article will explore the historic roots of this fundamental

fourth amendment debate. It will then review current manifestations
of the controversy, and examine their significance and justification in
history and precedent.
ORIGINS
The debate is informed by a history which began in the sixteenth
century when the people of England were first subjected to general
warrants. 1" General warrants varied in degree of offensiveness.
Typically, however, they authorized government agents to search "all
houses and places" for persons suspected of libels, and to "search in

any of the chambers, studies, chests, or other like places for all
manner of writing or papers ....Despite public outcry and parliamentary opposition,' 6 the British
judiciary did not confront the practice of issuing general search war-

rants until the reign of George III, two centuries after general warrants were introduced.' ' In 1765 Lord Camden, Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas, pronounced the judgment in Entick v. Carrington,' 8 a case regarded by the United States Supreme Court as
"one of the landmarks of English liberty."' 9 In Entick, Lord Camden condemned general warrants.
14. N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 23-27 (1937).
15. Id at 27 (quoting C. F. Tucker-Brooke, Works and Life of Christopher Marlowe 54 ff
(1930)) (from the text of a warrant issued by the Court of Star Chamber in 1593).
16. In 1680 the House of Commons investigated and ultimately impeached Chief Justice
Scroggs, the foremost advocate of general warrants. One of the articles of impeachment was
based on his issuance of " 'general warrants attaching the persons and seizing the goods of
his majesty's subjects, not named or described particularly,in the said warrants; by means
whereof, many . .. have been vexed, their houses entered into, and they themselves
grievously oppressed, contrary to law.' " N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 38.
17. Several controversial treason trials took place in the interim, in which general
warrants were utilized to assist the prosecution. The trial of Algernon Sydney is an example.
The Privy Council sent an order to seize all of Sydney's papers and writings. Some of these
were used to meet the requirement of a second witness in treason cases. N. Lasson, supra
note 14, at 39 n. 96. Some early constitutional scholars have noted that this seizure was
ultimately connected with the adoption of the fourth amendment. Id (citing T. Cooley,
The General Principles of Constitutional Law 267 (4th ed. 1931)).
18. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). An early challenge to
general warrants was made in Wilkes v. Wood, 95 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1763). However, it
was the forceful and eloquent opinion of Lord Camden in Entick that is striking today and,
more importantly, stood out to the framers of the fourth amendment as the "true and
ultimate expression of constitutional law." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626
(1886); W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 4.
19. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 626.
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If this point should be in favor of the government, the secret
cabinets and bureaus in this kingdom would be thrown open to the
search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state
shall see fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author,
printer, or publisher of a seditious libel.2

Lord Camden's opinion was issued just eleven years before the
colonies declared independence, and a quarter century before the
fourth amendment was proposed by Congress. There is no doubt that
when the fourth amendment was penned and adopted, "the language
of Lord Camden was relied on as expressing the true doctrine on the
subject of searches and seizures, and as furnishing the true criteria of
the reasonable and 'unreasonable' character of such seizures .. -21
Lord Camden's words were both near in time to the framing of the
Bill of Rights and also touched on a controversy which led directly
to the first serious friction between British officials and the colonists
-the use of writs of assistance 2 to enforce England's protectionist
trade restrictions in the colonies. 2
The writs of assistance significantly affected the colonists in two
ways, injuring both their pocketbooks and their cherished personal
privacy. They were significantly more abusive and arbitrary than
their English cousin, the general warrant. 2 3 The latter was at least
limited in scope and duration to a particular case of libel. Writs of
assistance provided a continuous authorization to search during the
lifetime of the sovereign. 2 4
Opposition to the writs was widespread, but particularly heated in
Massachusetts. 2 5 In 1761, sixty-three Massachusetts merchants,
represented by James Otis, petitioned against renewal of the writs of
assistance. 2 6 The Superior Court of Judicature of the Massachusetts
20. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1063 cited in N. Lasson, supra note
14, at 47. The British Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, had issued a warrant to search for
and seize John Entick, author of suspected seditious tracts, and his books and papers.
Entick sued for trespass on a theory that the general warrant was unlawful. The court ruled
in Entick's favor. Id
21. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630.
22. The writs were so called because they commanded all officers and subjects of the
Crown to assist in their execution. N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 53-54.
23. "The writ empowered the officer... to search, at ...will, wherever [he] suspected
uncustomed goods to be, and to break open any receptacle or package falling under [his]
suspecting eye." N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 54. Unlike the general warrants, the writs did
not authorize arrests. Moreover, they permitted on land searches only in the daytime. Id.
24. Id at 54. For a discussion of the history of writs of assistance in the colonies, see
Quincy's Massachusetts Reports: 1761-1772, Writs of Assistance, at 395.
25. N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 55.
26. Id. at 57-58. It seems somehow appropriate that in England the battle was fought by
journalists in political opposition to the King, while it was merchants stung by taxes who
opposed the writs in North America.
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Bay Colony was not prepared to match the boldness of its English
counterpart. It denied the merchants' petition and granted the application for the writs of assistance.2 7
Otis argued that general warrants were not sanctioned at common
law, were unconstitutional2 I and therefore void. 2 9 He described the
writs as "the worst instance of arbitrary power, the most destructive
of English liberty."'3 0
Though Otis did not succeed at bar, his oratory swayed the
people. 3 ' John Adams, then a young spectator, remembered the
scene years later.
Otis was a flame of fire! ...Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against Writs
of Assistance. Then and there was the first scene of opposition to
the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child's
Independence was born. In 15 years,
3 namely in 1776, he grew to
manhood, and declared himself free. 2

In the years between Otis' fiery oration and the Revolutionary
War, controversy over the writs continued.3 During that period,
most of the North American colonial courts refused to authorize
writs of assistance. 3 4 Ultimately, however, "a higher tribunal resolved the issue"; 3 the North American colonies severed their rela27. Quincy's Massachusetts Reports: 1761-1772, Paxton's Case, at 57.
28. To Otis and the colonial lawyers of his day the Constitution was obviously not the
document ratified in 1789. Rather, it was the body of documents, including the Magna
Carta, and common law which made up the English "constitution."
29. Quincy's Massachusetts Reports: 1761-1772, Paxton's Case, at 56; 2 C. Adams, The
Life and Works of John Adams 523-25 (1850).
30. 2 C. Adams, supra note 29, at 523 (quoting from Otis' corrected copy of a report
given in Minot's History).
31. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 625;W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 4; N. Lasson,
supra note 14, at 58-59.
32. 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 194 (1971) (quoting
Letter of John Adams to William Tudor (1817)). Adams' memory of details of the event
may have dimmed and been. colored by subsequent events. But his recollection of Otis'
impact on him and the audience were not mere illusion. Just fifteen years later, on July 3,
1776, he prepared to sign the Declaration of Independence. That morning he wrote to his
wife, "When I look back to the year 1761 ... and recollect the argument concerning the
writs of assistance in the superior court, which I have hitherto consideredas the commencement of the controversy between Great Britain and America, and recollect the series of
political events, the chain of causes and effects, I am surprised at the suddenness of this
revolution." N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 61 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Abigail
Adams) (emphasis added).
33. See the detailed chronicle of correspondence, petitions and motions challenging the
writs painstakingly assembled by Horace Gray, Jr., later Chief Justice of Massachusetts and
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Writs of Assistance, supra note 24, at 395-540.
34. Id at 500-11.
35. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 604 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting).
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with England, in no small part because of the furor over the
tionship
3
writs. 6
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The former colonies remained mindful of the Crown's abuses
when drafting their declarations of rights. The Virginia Declaration
of Rights was the first North American precedent for the federal Bill
of Rights. Article Ten of that famous document provided:
That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted. 3 7
In 1780, Massachusetts became the first state to proscribe "unreasonable searches and seizures. ' 3 8 Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights employed language similar to that
ultimately adopted in the fourth amendment.
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches,
and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause
or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or
affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make
search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure: and
no warrant ought to be3 issued but in cases, and with the formalities,
prescribed by the laws. 9
When the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, every
state had adopted a declaration or bill of rights, and each had inGenerally, these
cluded a provision on searches and seizures. 4
clauses were patterned on Virginia's proviso, specifically condemning
36. Remarkably, the list of grievances in the Declaration of Independence does not
mention writs of assistance. However, the grievance against writs may have been included
within the protest that the King had "sent hither swarms of officers to harass our
" N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 80.
people ..
37. 1 B. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 235 (citing 6 American Archives 1561 (P. Force ed.,
4th set. 1846)).
38. N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 82.
39. 1 B. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 342.
40. The only search and seizure case decided under one of the state bills of Tights before
the fourth amendment was drafted was Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787). In
Frisbie, the Connecticut Supreme Court found a warrant authorizing search of "all suspected places and persons" to be a general warrant and thus illegal. Id at 215.

Winter 1979-801

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

general warrants. 4 By 1780, each essential provision of the future
fourth amendment existed somewhere in the enactments of the
various states. These fourth amendment precursors provided for
security from unreasonable searches and seizures, with warrants permissible only on oath or affirmation and required to designate
specific persons or places and items to be seized upon some particular showing. Though each of the provisions varied somewhat, all
contained language clearly designed to prevent the abuses suffered
under the writs of assistance. 4 2 The former subjects of the King had
not forgotten, indeed could not have forgotten in so short a time, the
general warrants which had precipitated their rejection of the sovereign.
The Constitution as originally proposed and ratified contained no
bill of rights. That omission was nearly its undoing; the Constitution
was ratified with the understanding that it would be immediately
amended to include a bill of rights.4 I
When Washington took office in 1789, pressure for a bill of rights
was unrelenting and the President urged adoption of such guarantees. 4 4 James Madison introduced in Congress a search and seizure
clause which essentially contained the language of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses,
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or
things to be seized. 45
Madison's language explicitly defined "unreasonableness" in terms of
the general warrant.
Two changes were made in Madison's draft. It somehow emerged
from committee without the phrase "unreasonable searches and
seizures," but the omitted language was reinstated by the House on
motion of Elbridge Gerry. Representative Benson thought that the
words "by warrants issuing" were not sufficient. He proposed
41. N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 79-82.
42. For texts of the search and seizure provisions enacted by each state, see 1 B.
Schwartz, supra note 32, at 231-375.
43. See W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 5; N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 97. Indeed, two
states, North Carolina and Rhode Island, did not join the new Union until after the Bill of
Rights was submitted to the states by Congress. Id at 96-97 n. 62, 104.
44. W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 5; 2 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary
History 1011 (1974); N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 97.
45. 1 Annals of Congress 434-35 (1789-1790); 2 B. Schwartz, supra note 44, at 1027.
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stronger language-"and no warrant shall issue." His motion lost by a
considerable majority.4 6
Benson was a clever, if not totally scrupulous, parliamentarian. He
was subsequently appointed chairman of the committee charged to
arrange the amendments as passed by the House. In this capacity, he
simply reported out his own version of the search and seizure provision. 4 With Benson's unilateral modifications, the amendments
were sent to the Senate. There the provision on search and seizure
was received and approved without comment or alteration." The
version reported by Benson's committee and adopted by Congress
was ratified by the states. 9
It is Benson's language which created the two conjunctive clauses
in the fourth amendment, and thus the confusion over their relationship. Under the language proposed by Madison and actually passed
by the House, reasonableness is merely synonymous with the warrant
clause. The right to security against unreasonable searches and seizures could seemingly only be violated by general searches and
seizures which failed to meet the precise requirements of the warrant
clause. The structure of Madison's original clause directly links the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures to the
specific requirements of the warrant clause.
Arguably, Benson's amendment merely strengthened the link between the two clauses. 5 0 On the other hand, Benson's words could
have been intended to separate the two clauses, and thus to create a
right of security from unreasonable searches which extends to state
activity beyond that expressly covered by the warrant clause.5 1
Fourth amendment interpretation is not merely an exercise for
grammarians. "One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth Amendment ....
Words must be read with the gloss of the experience of those who
framed them." ' 2 The tyrannies of the general warrant were living
46. 1 Annals of Congress 754; W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 5; 2 B. Schwartz, supra note
44, at 1112; N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 101.
47. W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 5; N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 101.
48. Senate J. (Aug. 25, 1789), reprinted in 1 Documentary History of the First Federal
Congress of the United States of America: Senate Legislative J. 136 (De Pauw ed. 1972); 2
B. Schwartz, supra note 44, at 1146; N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 102.
49. Congress actually proposed twelve original amendments. The first two were never
ratified. Thus, at least one early opinion refers to the fourth amendment as the sixth article
of the Bill of Rights.
50. N. Lasson, supra note 14, at 103. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
51. W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 439.
52. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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experience, not mere memories for Madison and his colleagues in the
First Congress. The writs of assistance and the revolution, which was
in part intended to redress the grievances caused by those writs, were
fresh in the minds of the fourth amendment's framers. The Bill of
Rights' authors detailed the requirements for a valid warrant, thus
indicating that only a special warrant could support a constitutional
search. This specific prescription, illuminated by the framers' experience, "gives the key to what [they]
had in mind by prohibiting
'5
'unreasonable' searches and seizures." 3
EARLY JUDICIAL TREATMENT

Early decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreted
the fourth amendment in light of its history. The Supreme Court
first squarely addressed the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures in In re Jackson, ' almost 90 years after passage of the fourth amendment. In Jackson, the Court held that
searches of letters and sealed packages in the mail could only be
made pursuant to a warrant. Justice Field, on behalf of a unanimous
Court, wrote:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully
guarded from examination and inspection ...as if they were re-

tained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The
constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in
their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to

their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.
Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like

warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required
when papers are sub55

jected to search in one's own household

The Court thus indicated that fourth amendment reasonableness is
determined by reference to the detailed mandates of the warrant
clause. The Court in Jackson equated "reasonableness" with compliance with the warrant clause.
No review of the fourth amendment's development is complete
without discussion of Boyd v. United States,5 6 the case repeatedly
53. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. at 605 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
54. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
55. Id at 733 (emphasis added). It is noteworthy, in light of the present Court's rather
freewheeling application of a "balancing test" (see discussion in text accompanying notes
85-93 infra), that the Court in Jackson had no difficulty finding the people's right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures was "of far greater importance than the
transportation of the mail," a constitutionally established power of Congress. Id. at 732.
56. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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described by the Court as "[t] he leading case on the subject of
search and seizure . .

. ."

In Boyd, a subpoena for private papers

and records to be used by the government in a forfeiture proceeding
was challenged. The Court held that seizure of one's private papers
by subpoena duces tecum was compelled self-incrimination in violation of the fifth amendment privilege. In the Court's view, evidence
obtained contrary to the fifth amendment was also seized in violation of the fourth, and unlawful thereunder.' 8
Most important to this discussion is the Boyd Court's expansive
view of the fourth amendment, which was based on its perception of
the historic evolution of the freedoms guaranteed by the amendment. Justice Bradley, who delivered the Court's opinion, traced the
development of constitutional search and seizure provisions to
Entick v. Carrington and the North American Revolution.' 9 He observed that to understand the terms " 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' it is only necessary to recall the controversies on the subject
in this country and in England." '6 0 He referred, of course, to "the
6
practice . . . of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers."

1

He then discussed Entick and the controversy over writs of assistance, concluding, "Can we doubt that when the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution ... were penned and adopted, the
language of Lord Camden was relied on as ... furnishing the true

criteria of the reasonable and "unreasonable"

character of such

seizures? 62

The Court in its early fourth amendment opinions thus had not
lost sight of either the history of that constitutional provision, or of
the significance of that history. The justices in the late 19th century
understood that the framers used the broad phrase "unreasonable
searches and seizures" with reference to the particular evils of the
writs of assistance, evils specifically condemned by the rigorous
language of the warrant clause. With this historical insight, the Court
in 1886 viewed fourth amendment protections expansively.
57. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); see also One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965).
58. Id. at 622, 630-33. Some of the analysis in Boyd has been limited or cast aside in
subsequent opinions. See, e.g., Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (limiting the
view in Boyd of the link between the fourth and fifth amendments); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (rejecting the "mere evidence" rule). But it remains clear that Boyd "was
part of the process through which the Fourth Amendment. . . has become more than a dead
letter in the federal courts." Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan J.,
dissenting).
59. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 624-30.
60. Id. at 625.
61. Id. at 624-30.
62. Id at 630.
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UNPRINCIPLED REASONABLENESS: EVOLUTION, REJECTION
AND REVIVAL
In the 1940's, the Court departed somewhat from the historic
63
principles affirmed in Boyd and Jackson. Harris v. United States
6
4
and United States v. Rabinowitz enlarged the permissible scope of
searches incident to arrest. In each case the majority took a view of
reasonableness that was neither informed by history nor grounded in
the provisions of the warrant clause.
Justice Minton's majority opinion in Rabinowitz embodies the
expanded view of reasonableness adopted in the 1940's.
What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula. The Constitution does not define what are "unreasonable"
searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus-

paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches
must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case.
[Citations omitted.] Reasonableness
is in the first instance for the
65
District Court to determine.

In Minton's view, neither the history nor the language of the fourth
amendment provide a principle for determining what is a reasonable
search. Rather, the inquiry is made by district courts on an ad hoc
basis.
Justice Frankfurter vigorously dissented in both Rabinowitz and
Harris. He emphasized that the amendment's prescription of reasonable searches and seizures must be read in light of "the history that
gave rise to the words," a history of "abuses so deeply felt ...

as to

be one of the potent causes of the Revolution." 6 6 The abuses referred to by Justice Frankfurter were, of course, the general warrants
and he wrote:
When the Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasonable searches" and
then went on to define the very restricted authority that even a
search warrant could give, the framers said with all the clarity of the
gloss of history that a search is "unreasonable" unless a warrant
authorizes
it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute neces6
sity. 7
Rabinowitz and Harris were overruled in 1969 by Chimel v. California.68 The seven Justices comprising the Chimel majority ex63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Id. at 63.
Id at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id.
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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pressly endorsed Justice Frankfurter's view in Rabinowitz of the
history and meaning of "reasonable searches and seizures." They
further noted that "[il n the scheme of the Amendment . . . the
requirement that 'no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,'
plays a crucial part." 6 9 The search warrant requirement was "not
lightly to be dispensed with.. .. -" 0
The year 1968 marks an important development in fourth amendment history. In Terry v. Ohio,7 1 the Court extended protection
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" to the "protean variety
of street encounters," 7 2 which were intrusions for fourth amendment purposes, but within "an entire rubric of police conduct ...
which historically has not been and ... could not be subjected to the
warrant procedure." 7 3 Though distinguishing these "stop and frisk"
practices from full-scale search or arrest, Chief Justice Warren in
speaking for the majority stressed that "the notions which underlie
both the warrant procedure and the 74
requirement of probable cause
remain fully relevant in this context."
To assess reasonableness, the Court in Terry established a balancing test, "balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion
which the search for seizure] entails."1 5 Throughout the opinion,
the Chief Justice emphasized the "necessity" of swift police action
under the circumstances of on-the-street stops and frisks, and the
unreasonableness of denying officers the power to take "necessary
76
measures" to determine whether a suspect is armed and dangerous.
It is the need for appropriate police action and self-protection in
certain types of street encounters which the Court balanced against
an intrusion "much less severe than that involved in traditional
arrests." ,77 This weighing of interests was, moreover, guided by the
provisions of the warrant clause. 7
The Court in Terry prohibited stops unless based on an objective
standard in order to preserve "the more detached, neutral scrutiny of
a judge" ' 79 even if only after the fact. 8 0 The Court also required
69. Id at 761.

70. Id. at 762.
71. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

72. Id. at 15.
73. Id at 20.
74. Id.
75. Id at 21 (emphasis added).
76. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 23-26.

77. Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 22, 48 (1979).
78. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
79. Id. at 21. See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1975).
80. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
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particularized grounds for the intrusion, requiring specific and articulable facts which, considered in light of rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warranted either a suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot or that the suspect was armed and dangerous. 8'
Considerably less rigorous than the probable cause requirement
specified in the warrant clause, the "reasonable suspicion test" nevertheless serves the same objective. As Chief Justice Warren observed,
"Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction." 8 2
In short, Terry unshackled fourth amendment jurisprudence, extending its coverage to an increasingly important category of police
activity, the investigative "stop and frisk." 8 3 While thus modernizing
search and seizure law, the Court nonetheless respected the amendment's history and carefully considered each of the safeguards to
reasonableness implicit in the warrant clause. It diluted those safeguards only to the extent necessary to deal realistically with street
encounters. 8 4
With the changes in Supreme Court personnel beginning the year
after Terry, came subtle, almost imperceptible shifts in the application of Terry's balancing test. The exacting requirements of the warrant clause no longer provided the standard against which to measure
reasonableness. Instead, "regularized" operations and decisions by
high ranking law enforcement officials became constitutionally adequate surrogates for neutral judicial review.8 5
Moreover, the Court sanctioned substantial departures from the
principles of the warrant clause 8 6 without the justification of necessity that had traditionally been required. 8 7 The Court no longer
spoke in terms of the state's "need" to carry on a particular intrusion
of fourth amendment rights. Rather, it weighed "the public interest
against the fourth amendment interest of the individual ....

"8

The

81. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392
at 21. The Court in Brignoni-Ponce articulated the "reasonable suspicion" language
popularly used to describe the Terry test. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at
82. 392 U.S. at 22.
83. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters
Beyond, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 40, 42-46 (1968).
84. See text accompanying notes 73-77.
85. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).

U.S.
now
880.
and

86. See Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
87. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
88. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555 (citing United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
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public interest did not have to be a public necessity. The interests
seemed almost equally balanced.
Great deference has been shown in some of the Burger Court
decisions to the reasons articulated by the state for choosing one
search technique over a less intrusive alternative.8 9 During its last
term, the Court upheld routine visual inspections of the body cavities
of pretrial detainees without any particularized showing of even
reasonable suspicion because the prison's choice of such procedure
had "not been shown to be irrational or unreasonable." 9 0 This is a
rather tenuous basis for upholding a serious invasion of privacy and
personal dignity. For the first time, the Court has also upheld "seizures" of persons on nothing more than an officer's hunch.9 1 It has
allowed "searches" of the most private parts of the body without
probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion.9 2 These holdings
represent a substantial departure from the Court's solicitude for
fourth amendment rights, 9 and a revival of the subjective reasonableness theory of the forties.9 4
A RETURN TO PRINCIPLED REASONABLENESS-THE COURT IN
THE 1979 TERM

The opinion in Bell v. Wolfish, 9 handed down last term, marks one
of the most substantial departures from traditional fourth amendment doctrine. 9 6 Yet, in the same term the Court decided two cases
89. Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85 & n. 40.
90. Id. at 1884 n. 40. The dissent, after a detailed discussion demonstrating that the
challenged practices were unnecessary, even arbitrary, concluded that they merely satisfied
the convenience of the staff.
91. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (an officer may order a driver out
of a properly stopped vehicle without reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (an immigration officer may stop
vehicles going through a fixed checkpoint without reasonable suspicion). The only apparent
requirement in Martinez-Fuerte,Mimms, or Wolfish is that a search or seizure be part of a
regularized procedure.
92. See Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
93. Cf Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
94. In the early 1970's, the Court decided three cases in which administrative inspections
were allowed without requiring warrants, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (inspection of licensed gun dealer's storeroom);
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home visits by welfare caseworker); Colonnade
Catering v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (inspection of liquor dealer's premises).
These cases further evidence the Court's move towards a relaxed standard of reasonableness. Biswell and Colonnade Catering, at least, have been effectively limited as exceptions
based on peculiar sets of facts. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
95. 99 S.Ct.1861 (1979).
96. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
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in which, while applying the balancing test, it refused to dilute the
reasoning and result in Terry. In Brown v. Texas9 and Delaware v.
Prouse9l the Court required that officers have the Terry-mandated
"reasonable suspicion" based on "articulable facts" 9 9 in order to
stop for questioning either pedestrians (in Brown) or auto drivers (in
Prouse). Thus the Court at least indirectly endorsed Terry's respect
for the historically defined concerns addressed in the fourth amendment's warrant clause.
Perhaps more significant is the Court's decision in Dunaway v.
New York. ' oo There the Court found that local police had violated
the fourth and fourteenth amendments when, "without probable
cause to arrest, they took petitioner into custody, transported him to
the police station, and detained him there for interrogation." 1 0 1 The
Court rejected a "reasonable police conduct under the circumstances" test for determining the propriety of custodial detentions
for questioning, noting that under such a test "the protections intended by the Framers would all too easily disappear ...."102 The

Court emphasized that " 'probable cause has roots that are deep in
our history

. .

.'"'

'

and that "[h] ostility to seizures based on mere

suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment .... 04

CONCLUSION-THE LESSON OF HISTORY IN
FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Dunaway exemplifies the current state of the Frankfurter-Minton
controversy. It appears that both jurists have been partially vindicated. The warrant clause requirements are directly applicable to all
full-scale searches and seizures. Absent certain historically recognized
exceptions, prior judicial approval, specificity of description, and
particularized probable cause are fourth amendment requisites.
Other substantially less intrusive search and seizure activities are
tested under the reasonableness clause. Reasonableness is defined by
reference to the warrant clause requirements and with a view to the
historic abuses specifically addressed by that provision. Those abuses
included searches and seizures upon mere suspicion, not meaning97. Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979).
98. Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
99. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
100. 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1978).
101. Id at 2253.
102. Id. at 2257.
103. Id at 2256 (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959)).
104. Id at 2256-57.
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fully subject to judicial review, and without specific limitations on
the scope of the intrusion. It is in applying the test of reasonableness
to such less intrusive police activities that the modern version of the
debate between Justices Frankfurter and Minton is crystallized.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Dunaway marks a return to a
reasoned consideration of the history which gave rise to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. It is only in
the context of that history that the peculiar construction of the
fourth amendment has meaning which can be translated into
standards for applying the Terry balancing test for reasonableness.
Despite somewhat tenuous precedent, a balancing test is a useful
means of determining the "reasonableness" of certain "brief and
0
As in Terry, however,
narrowly circumscribed intrusions ..
such a test must be applied carefully in light of the historically
dictated safeguards of the fourth amendment as specified in the warrant clause.
First of all, the balancing test is only appropriate in those exceptional cases of "narrowly defined"' 06 categories of searches or
seizures "substantially less intrusive"' o ' than ordinary search or
seizure. 1 0 8 In all other circumstances, "the requisite balancing has
been performed in centuries of precedent.""'09 Moreover, a court
applying the balancing test to a particular police practice must strive
to guarantee that any relaxation in the specificity of the showing
required to justify such intrusion, or flexibility in the limitations on
its scope be only such as is clearly demanded by actual necessity.
Finally, the courts must provide the most timely and principled
judicial review consistent with proven necessity.
If it was not clear before, it is clear since Terry that fourth amendment "reasonableness" is not synonymous with the warrant requirements specified in the second clause.' 10 It is, however, one thing to
say that the first clause of the amendment is not simply redundant
and quite another to assert that the two provisions are unrelated.
Such a claim flies in the faces of the repeatedly emphasized historical
development of search and seizure law, the language of the amendment, including its somewhat bizarre legislative history, and finally,
the unfolding of fourth amendment jurisprudence.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. at 2257.
Id. at 2256.
Id at 2255.
Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. at 2257.
Id.
W. LaFave, supra note 2, at 439.
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Two aspects of the writs of assistance were most deplored. First,
they lacked specificity as to places or persons to be searched and as
to items to be seized. They also authorized police to arrest and
search on mere suspicion, without meaningful judicial review.
As discussed above, it was these abuses which the authors of the
fourth amendment believed unreasonable, and it was to these particularly severe features of the writs of assistance that the warrant
clause was expressly addressed. The warrant clause prohibits searches
or seizures based on mere suspicion and requires a showing of probable cause. That probable cause standard effectively balances the
interests of individual privacy and public safety for most types of
fourth amendment intrusions.' 1 ' The fourth amendment also
demands specific descriptions of places to be searched and persons or
things to be seized. Implicit in the warrant clause is the additional
requirement of prior judicial review of warrant application.' 12
Consequently, reasonableness in the context of the fourth amendment must be defined by reference to the exacting requirements of
the warrant clause and the protection those mandates were designed
to provide. It is the warrant clause which provides the standard for
determining what is a reasonable search and seizure under the fourth
amendment.' '3 A search is reasonable to the extent that it avoids
the abuses of the general warrant and conforms to the norms of
specificity, judicial review, and particularized showing mandated by
the warrant clause.
Bell v. Wolfish may be an aberration in fourth amendment analysis
because it involves the fourth amendment rights of prisoners whose
very right to fourth amendment protections is unclear.' 1 4 Brown,
Prouse and particularly Dunaway may indicate that the Court is
renewing its commitment to principled determination of reasonableness by reference to the origins of search and seizure law.

111. Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. at 2257.
112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 357 (1967).
113. See Dunaway v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1945); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
114. See Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. at 1877; Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44
(1962).

